

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

021120Z Aug 04

ACTION AF-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	CIAE-00	INL-00	USNW-00	DODE-00	PERC-00
	DS-00	EAP-00	VC-00	H-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00	M-00	AC-00	DCP-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OIG-00	OMB-00	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	ACE-00
	P-00	FMPC-00	SP-00	IRM-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	IIP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00	SAS-00
	/001W						

-----493381 021121Z /38

FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY
SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6636
INFO ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ACCRA 001591

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2014

TAGS: [PREL](#) [GH](#) [ECOWAS](#)

SUBJECT: ACCRA III: AGREEMENT REACHED ON COTE D'IVOIRE;
LIBERIA, SUDAN CONSIDERED

REF: ACCRA 1581

Classified By: Polchief Richard Kaminski, reason 1.5 (B/D).

Summary

11. (SBU) Ivoirien parties reached late-night agreement July 30 to revive the Linas-Marcoussis Accords (LMA). The Agreement sets forth four main components: use of presidential powers to revise eligibility for the presidency; a new DDR timetable; delegation of powers to the prime minister; and resumption of the Government of National Reconciliation. Much appears to have been agreed privately, as the agreement itself does not give many specifics. On Liberia, parties agreed to more regular consultations, with no communique to be issued, to avoid any suggestion that last summer's peace agreement had been altered or reinterpreted. On Sudan, President Obasanjo issued a statement upon his early departure from Accra, calling upon the Government of Sudan to end the violence, and noting plans to expand the proposed African force. End summary.

Agreement on Cote d'Ivoire, But Details Lacking

12. (C) Parties to the LMA signed an Accra III Agreement on Cote d'Ivoire at approximately 11:00 p.m. July 30, after hours of protracted shuttle negotiations at the Accra conference facility. Ivoirien delegations met repeatedly with UNSG Kofi Annan in the final hours, and overcame the nearly-two-day impasse. Most participants attributed the extended deliberations to the unwillingness of President Gbagbo to accept compromise language on Article 35, the section of the Ivoirien constitution governing presidential eligibility. (Late July 29, for example, Gbagbo apparently feigned illness to avoid an after-hours meeting with Annan, Obasanjo and Kufuor on that topic).

13. (C) Earlier misgivings among ECOWAS and UN staff, as they wrestled to compose the text of an Agreement that, in their eyes, reflected little real progress in the negotiations, perceptibly cleared after the final round of sequential deliberations among Annan and Ivoirien leaders (Ouattara, Bedie and Soro together, followed by Gbagbo). "Gbagbo finally gave in," said Jimmy Aggrey-Orleans, special assistant to UN Special Representative Tevoedjre.

14. (C) The Agreement provides for the use of Gbagbo's constitutional powers to "implement by the end of September" the sections of the LMA governing presidential eligibility (i.e., changing the requirement that both parents of a candidate be Ivoirien). Several participants told polchief that this referred to "emergency powers," presumably meant as an acceptable mechanism for altering the constitution itself (and overcoming Gbagbo's insistence that the Constitution trumps LMA -- he would use his own emergency powers to "adjust" the constitution). Parties also agreed upon the adoption of all LMA "legal reform" proposals, now before the National Assembly, by the end of August.

15. (U) On DDR, parties agreed to "commit themselves to the commencement" of the disarmament process by October 15. A new timetable forms the basis of the agreement; parties also agreed that DDR would cover "all paramilitary and militia" groups. Several participants commented that the new DDR

timetable had been one of the easiest proposals to deal with, and one of the first agreed to by the parties.

16. (SBU) On delegation of powers to the prime minister, the Agreement provides for the President to "undertake to translate the terms" of his December 15 2003 letter on delegation into a decree, which "shall specify the areas covered by the delegation." The Agreement notes that the president and the prime minister "agreed on a decree" for that delegation, and for "adequate additional measures." (Comment: this language does not seem to clarify the nature or extent of delegated powers. End comment).

17. (U) On resumption of the government, the Agreement provides that the various parties "agreed on the urgency of resuming the work of the Government of National Reconciliation," and further agreed to convene a meeting of the council of ministers "within a week."

18. (U) The Agreement also provides for a tripartite monitoring body, composed of ECOWAS, AU and UN personnel, which is to make "fortnightly" reports. A human rights commission, provided for under LMA, is to be established "without further delay."

19. (U) Note: the Agreement was faxed to AF/W July 31, and is

now available on the net, for example at Abidjan.net.

Liberia: Meetings, But No Formal Communique

10. (SBU) LURD (Kabineh Janneh, George Dweh, among others), MODEL, representatives of the former GOL (including Moses Blah) and Interim Chairman Gyude Bryant of the Transitional Government met until approximately 7:00 p.m. July 30. Ghanaian Foreign Minister Akufo-Addo chaired the latter stages of the meetings, with General Abubakar, last summer's peace talks mediator, also attending. AU personnel present at the deliberations said no communique would be issued, so as to avoid any suggestion that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had been altered or reinterpreted. A low-level "report" of some sort would be issued instead. The parties focused on better communication among the signatories to the CPA, with weekly cabinet meetings a possibility. Attempts were also made to mediate intra-LURD disputes. LURD representatives appeared to accept the concept of better consultation as a starting point for a more effective government (Janneh with better grace than Dweh, in comments to polchief).

Sudan: Call for Peace, Plans for Bigger African Force

11. (U) Upon his early departure from Accra July 30, President Obasanjo issued a press release (faxed to AF/W) on Sudan. Noting that a meeting "on the margins" of Accra III occurred to discuss the situation, he called upon the Sudanese government to end the violence. Obasanjo also noted efforts to insert an African Union force to provide protection of an observer mission, and to facilitate humanitarian assistance. The statement says that participants "agreed that this African force needs to be significantly expanded." The statement closes in calling upon the international community to assist with logistics and financial support.

Comment

12. (C) Relief, mingled with fatigue, characterized the reactions of many of the UN and ECOWAS personnel present for the final late-night signature of the Agreement. However, key details appear to be lacking in the text itself, whatever the private understandings may be: how Gbagbo is to apply his emergency powers, how the government is to reconstitute itself, and exactly what powers will ultimately be delegated to the prime minister. End comment.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

YATES

NNNN